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Abstract 
We analyse stock price behaviour around the disclosure of corporate insider transactions 
after the introduction of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD). Ranking according to our 
Insider Trading Enforcement (ITE) index highlights significant differences in the MAD 
enforcement between French and German legal origin countries. We document 
contrarian behaviour of insiders in all of the sample countries. Insiders reveal significant 
information to the public through both their purchases and sales. The price impact of the 
insiders’ transactions is particularly strong in countries with a lower ITE index (i.e. 
weaker public enforcement).  
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1. Introduction 
While insider trading regulation has existed in the US since 1934 and in the UK since 
1976, comparable regulatory requirements were only developed in continental Europe 
in the last twenty years. The European Community (EC), in its efforts to strengthen the 
integrity of the member states’ financial markets and thereby enhance market efficiency, 
released the Insider Dealing and Money Laundering Directive (89/592/EEC) in 1989. 
The directive legally defined insiders and insider information and was transposed into 
national law during the 1990’s by most of the member states. In 2003, the Market 
Abuse Directive (MAD) (2003/6/EC) replaced the old (1989) directive.
1
 The overall 
objective was to introduce a European Union (EU) standard for insider dealing and 
market manipulation so as to promote market integrity and instill investor confidence in 
the financial markets.
2
 
 
The importance of the enforcement of securities laws and regulations against financial 
markets misconduct has been documented in prior international studies (see Cumming 
et al. (2015) for an excellent synthesis of relevant studies). The evidence about the 
relative importance of private and public enforcement of securities laws for financial 
market development is, however, inconclusive (e.g., Djankov et al., 2008; Jackson and 
Roe, 2009). Since recent regulation was not introduced in response to a specific case of 
market abuse in any of the EU countries, but was mandated (exogenously) by the EU, it 
represents a unique natural experiment (Aitken et al., 2015). This experiment, therefore, 
allows us to examine the importance of public enforcement of the MAD on insider 
                                                 
1
 The directive 2003/6/EC is complemented by four other EU initiatives, namely the Commission 
Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC and the Commission Regulation 2273/2003. The 
non EU-member Switzerland implemented a similar regulation that closely follows the definitions of the 
EU regulation (see ESMA, 2012). 
2
 A comprehensive analysis of the Market Abuse Directive is provided in Siems (2008). 
dealing across European countries. Specifically, we analyse the information content of 
insider trading disclosures in seven continental European countries: Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. Our sample comprises 
46,172 insider trading disclosures from 2,096 companies during the period 1
st
 January 
2006 to 31
st
 December 2013. Thus, our sample period begins after the implementation 
of the MAD and, therefore, includes countries with the same regulation. Notably, all 
sample countries are governed by civil law with less emphasis on private litigation 
compared to common law countries (see Jackson and Roe, 2009). The sample countries 
are, however, split between German (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland) and French 
(France, Belgium, Italy, and Netherlands) legal origin with important differences.
3
 
Previous literature, for example, document differences between German and French 
legal origin countries in: (i) the development of financial intermediaries and markets 
(Beck et al., 2003); (ii) strategies for protecting minority shareholders and creditors (La 
Porta et al., 1998); (iii) regulation of security issuance through security laws (La Porta 
et al., 2006); (iv) and regulation of insider trading (Cumming et al., 2011). It is, 
however, not clear whether German or French legal systems generate better public 
enforcement in the area of insider dealing. 
 
The differences in public enforcement of the MAD among our sample countries could 
lead to varying price effects following the disclosure of insider transactions. For 
example, weaker enforcement leads to investors’ mistrust and less transparent markets. 
This in turn results in less reliable information available to investors. Accordingly, we 
                                                 
3
 We follow the La Porta et al. (1998) classification of legal origin. 
predict more positive abnormal returns after purchases and more negative abnormal 
returns after sales in countries with weaker public enforcement of insider regulation.  
 
Jackson and Roe (2009) and Fidrmuc et al. (2013) are works closest to ours, although 
our approach differs from prior work in two important ways. First, we develop an index 
for our sample countries that focuses specifically on public enforcement of the MAD in 
the context of insider trading. Our public enforcement Insider Trading Index (ITE) 
combines regulators’ formal legal powers (sanctioning approach, penalties, and 
disclosure of decisions), resource-based measures of public enforcement (supervisory 
capacity), and evidence on actual enforcement activities (number of sanctions and 
discharges). The importance of information on the actual enforcement activities was 
highlighted in previous literature (e.g., Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Jackson and 
Roe, 2009) but has not been examined due to lack of data. Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002), for example, suggest that for efficiency of insider trading regulation the key 
issue is not whether formal powers exist, but whether regulators actually exercise the 
powers by sanctioning offenders. 
 
Second, Fidrmuc et al. (2013) use the Anti-self-dealing (ASD) index of Djankov et al. 
(2008) as a measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation 
by corporate insiders.
4
 Although relevant to insider dealing, self-dealing (or “private 
                                                 
4
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) list the following forms of self-dealing: executive perquisites, excessive 
compensation, transfer pricing, appropriation of corporate opportunities, self-serving financial 
transactions such as directed equity issuance or personal loans to insiders, and outright theft of corporate 
assets. 
benefits of control”) does not specifically include insider dealing.5 Furthermore, the 
ASD index is a proxy for private rather than public enforcement and has been calculated 
based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, thus, long before the implementation of the 
MAD.  
 
Our main findings are first that French legal origin countries (France, Italy, Belgium, 
and Netherlands) score significantly better in terms of the ITE index compared to their 
German (Austria, German, and Switzerland) origin counterparts. The results are robust 
compared to alternative proxies for ITE constituents. Second, insider purchase 
transactions tend to take place after decline in abnormal returns. The purchases create a 
significant positive price effect resulting in positive cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). This positive effect is more pronounced in countries with a lower ITE Index 
(weaker public enforcement). The effect of prior sales and firm size are negative and 
statistically significant in all sub-periods, whilst transaction volume is significant during 
and after the financial crisis only. Overall, we find evidence for the existence of typical 
contrarian strategies for insider purchases. Third, we report relevant pricing information 
for sale transactions, in contrast to corresponding findings for the US (Lakonishik and 
Lee, 2001). Insiders also tend to adopt contrarian strategies when they sell shares of 
their own companies. The enforcement of insider trading regulation plays an important 
role for sale transactions only during the crisis period, a period characterized by a much 
larger information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors. 
 
                                                 
5
 The ASD index focuses on the following question: “if a controlling shareholder wants to enrich himself 
while following the law, how difficult is it for minority shareholders to thwart such activity before it takes 
place and to recover damages if it does occur?” (Djankov et al., 2008, page 432). 
The paper is structured as follows. We begin in Section 2 by a review of the relevant 
literature and motivation of our research hypotheses. In Section 3 we explore the 
enforcement of regulation on insider trading and develop our ITE public enforcement 
index. In Section 4 we describe our dataset and the sample selection procedure, and in 
Section 5 we present the chosen methodology. The empirical results are discussed in 
Section 6, followed by robustness checks in Section 7. Concluding remarks are set forth 
in Section 8. 
 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
2.1 Price effect of legal insider trading 
A large majority of previous academic research in the field of legal insider trading has 
focused on the US. For example, research on legal corporate insider trading documents 
that US insiders (and to some extent outsiders mimicking insiders’ behavior) are able to 
earn significant abnormal returns. These results are documented in the early studies 
(see, e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Finnerty, 1976; or Seyhun, 1986) and confirmed by more recent 
US studies (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Jeng et al., 2003; or Aktas et al., 2008). 
Abnormal returns earned by insiders are due to the contrarian investment style adopted 
by insiders as well as their exploitation of private information.
6
 The above findings 
were echoed in studies of the UK market (see Pope et al., 1990; Gregory et al., 1997; 
Friederich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). Fidrmuc et al. (2006), for example, 
reported significant abnormal returns following insider transactions in the UK. The 
                                                 
6
 Cziraki et al. (2016) report complementarities between information in event announcements (i.e. share 
repurchases and seasoned equity offerings) and pre-event insider trading. There is also evidence that the 
presence of short sellers (Massa et al., 2015) and CDS trading affects trading behavior and ability of 
insiders to extract rent on their private information (To et al., 2016).  
reported returns were higher than in the US market due to faster reporting of trades in 
the UK. 
 
Compared to the US and the UK, evidence for continental EU countries is less available 
and less conclusive. For example, whilst some studies report statistically significant 
price effects around announcement days in Austria (Fidrmuc et al., 2013) and Italy 
(Dardas and Guttler, 2011; Bajo and Petracci, 2006), others report no statistically 
significant abnormal returns in these countries.
7
 Overall, the evidence for Germany 
(Klinge et al., 2005; Dymke and Walter, 2008; Aussenegg and Ranzi, 2008; Betzer and 
Theissen, 2009; Dardas and Guttler, 2011), Belgium (Fidrmuc et al., 2013) and 
Netherlands (Aktas et al., 2007; Dardas and Guttler, 2011; Fidrmuc et al., 2013; Cziraki 
et al., 2014; Biesta et al., 2003) is more conclusive in suggesting statistically significant 
abnormal returns around the announcement of insider trades. A rare study on 
Switzerland also suggests statistically significant price effects (Zingg et al., 2007). Del 
Brio et al. (2002) report that outsiders cannot benefit from mimicking disclosed insider 
trades in Spain. However, there are no previous EU studies covering the most recent 
period and examining specifically the information content of insider trades during and 
after the 2008-10 financial crisis. US evidence suggests that contrarian trades could be 
profitable during the financial crises (see Friedrich et al. 2002; Seyhun, 1990; 
Gangopadhyay et al., 2009). In line with the ‘flight to quality’ hypothesis, investors 
move towards blue chip stocks which depresses the price of smaller stocks. Corporate 
insiders may view this as a time to ‘pick up bargains’. We therefore conjecture that 
insiders tend to adopt a contrarian strategy, especially during financial crises. 
                                                 
7
 See for example Dardas and Guttler (2011) for evidence on Austria and Fidrmuc et al. (2013) for 
evidence on Italy. 
Asymmetric information theory implies that the uncertainty about the value of smaller 
companies is higher than that of larger, well-known firms. Larger firms are typically 
followed by more analysts and are more easily forced to disclose private information to 
the public. Previous evidence also suggests that larger firms tend to be priced more 
efficiently (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Thus, we expect larger abnormal price effects 
of insiders’ transactions in smaller firms. 
 
Gregory et al. (1997) suggest that, according to the microstructure theory, trading 
volume is a signal itself. Large trades are expected to have a larger impact than small 
trades. As the disclosure of legal insider trades takes place only several days after the 
trade, during this interval the information content of the trading volume will have 
caused a large (small) price adjustment for large (small) transactions. Therefore, the 
additional effect on security prices of the disclosure of a legal insider trade will be 
relatively more pronounced for larger trades than for smaller trades.  Similarly, the 
extent of the reduction in information asymmetry due to the purchase or sale 
transactions of insiders should be positively associated with the number of insiders that 
are buying or selling on the same trading day. There is, for example, a difference 
between one insider buying (selling) and more insiders buying (selling) on a specific 
date. If more insiders buy (sell), this may convey more information than if only one 
insider trades. We also control for purchases (sales) during the period of 20 trading days 
prior to the date of disclosure. We conjecture a weaker price impact of purchase (sale) 
transactions that follow insiders’ sale (purchase) transactions. Thus, the reversals in 
trades are expected to have lower information content.  
 
2.2 Enforcement of security laws and legal insider trading  
Previous literature suggests that insider trading laws fail to mitigate insider trading 
(Bris, 2005) and often do more harm than good when not properly enforced (see Beny, 
2005 and 2007; Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002 and 2009). The literature also 
documents the importance of the enforcement of insider trading laws for price 
informativeness. Fernandes and Ferreira (2009), for example, report that enforcement 
affects price informativeness differently depending on a country's infrastructure. The 
positive impact of the intensity of enforcement (measured by a country’s first-time 
enforcement of insider trading laws) on the price informativeness tends to be 
concentrated in developing countries with more efficient judicial systems, investor 
protection, and financial reporting.  
 
Fidrmuc et al. (2013) examine how shareholder protection impacts the price effect of 
the disclosure of insider trading. They analyse sixteen countries, over the period from 
2002 to 2007. Authors utilise the anti-self-dealing (ASD) index of Djankov et al. (2008) 
and provide evidence for the information-content hypothesis: shareholder protection 
enhances the transparency and trustworthiness of insider trades and, therefore, increases 
the (positive) market reaction to insider purchases. For sales, shareholder protection 
decreases their (negative) information content. Authors also report that their results are 
robust to heterogeneity in MAD enforcement in their subsample of EU countries. 
 
Cziraki et al. (2014) examine insider trading from a point of view of private benefits of 
control and potential rent extraction. For example, the absence of anti-shareholder 
devices (i.e. less private benefits of control) leads to greater shareholder awareness 
which might curb insider trading and result in lower profits (the monitoring hypothesis). 
The private benefits of control however tend to be larger compared to potential profits 
generated by insider trading. When insiders cannot exploit private benefits, they are 
motivated to engage in insider trading (the substitution hypothesis). The authors report 
that insider trades are more profitable at Dutch firms where shareholder rights are not 
restricted by anti-shareholder mechanisms, which is in line with the substitution 
hypothesis. 
 
Christensen et al. (2011) document that market liquidity in EU countries increases with 
stricter implementation and enforcement of the European directives, stricter securities 
regulations, and a better track record of implementing regulation and government 
policies.
8
 More recently, Cumming et al. (2016) report significant differences in the 
intensity of enforcement of the MAD across European countries. There is, however, a 
paucity of literature on MAD enforcement for price informativeness. We add to the 
literature by examining the differences in public (rather than private) enforcement of the 
most recent regulation (MAD) and the effect of the enforcement level on the price 
impact of the disclosure of insiders’ transactions. We conjecture a negative association 
between the public enforcement and the price impact of the disclosure of insider trades. 
A stronger public enforcement improves standards and leads to better transparency and 
better quantity and quality (i.e. precision) of information available to investors. Insider 
trades in countries with a stricter public enforcement should, therefore, result in a 
smaller price impact compared to the price impact in countries with a weaker 
enforcement. The above prediction is consistent with disclosure models (Verrecchia, 
2001) and enforcement theory (Djankov et al., 2003). The prediction is also in line with 
                                                 
8
 For evidence on securities laws and misconduct in primary (i.e. IPO) markets, see Bonaventura et al. 
(2016). 
the application of the enforcement theory to securities regulation (Shleifer, 2005; 
Bhattarcharya and Daouk, 2009; Cumming et al., 2011). 
 
  
3. Insider trading regulation and public enforcement (ITE) index 
The MAD requires each member state to establish a single regulatory and supervisory 
authority to address insider dealing and market manipulation. Importantly, the new 
directive requires corporate insiders to immediately (i.e. within 5 trading days) disclose 
their trades. Under Article 18 of the MAD, EU member states had to implement local 
regulations that require the disclosure of corporate insider trading by October, 12
th
 
2004. With the exception of Germany, implementation took longer and was completed 
only in 2005. For example, Cumming and Johan (2008) indicate that EU exchanges did 
not adopt/implement the provisions in the MAD in a meaningful way during 2004-2005. 
In December 2004 the Transparency Directive (TD) was approved (2004/109/EC), 
followed by the implementation of the directive in March 2007 (2007/14/EC). TD 
focuses on greater transparency and enforcement of the existing disclosure 
requirements. 
 
We use the following criteria when calculating our insider trading enforcement (ITE) 
index: (i) The enforcement record: 1 if above (or equal to) the median ratio of the 
number of natural or legal persons sanctioned or discharged for insider dealing (2008-
10) and the stock market trading volume during the same period;
9
 (ii) Sanctioning 
                                                 
9
 The average stock market trading volume (in billion US$) for all countries, except Switzerland, is from 
Cumming et al. (2016). The average stock market trading volume (2007-09; in billion US$) for 
Switzerland is from the SIX Swiss Exchange (Annual Statistics-various issues, available from: www.six-
approach: 1 if both sanctioning approaches were followed, 0 if either an administrative 
or criminal sanctions approach was followed;
10
 (iii) Disclosure of sanctioning decisions: 
1 if disclosed, 0 otherwise; (iv) Maximum penalty for MAD related insider trading 
abuses: 1 if above (or equal to) the median penalty in the sample countries, 0 otherwise; 
(v) Maximum penalty for TD insider trading related abuses: 1 if above (or equal to) the 
median penalty in the sample countries, 0 otherwise;
11
 (vi) Supervisory capacity: 1 if 
the average number of staff employed in the national banking and insurance regulating 
institutions normalised by a country’s stock market trading volume is above (or equal 
to) the median, and 0 otherwise.
12
 The ITE Index is created by summing up the above 
six indicators thus generating a scale of 0 to 6. Table 1 provides a summary of 
information related to the enforcement of the MAD and TD directives in our sample 
countries. Austria, Switzerland and Germany rank low on sanctioning (columns 6, 7 and 
8). Switzerland is also ranked at the bottom by supervisory capacity (column 9) whilst 
Germany and Austria perform well on this component. By legal origin, French civil law 
countries perform marginally worse on supervisory capacity but better on penalties and 
number of sanctions. 
 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
 
                                                                                                                                               
swiss-exchange.com). The number of natural and legal persons sanctioned or discharged for insider 
dealing during 2008-10, is from ESMA (2012; Tables F.3.2 A and B). 
10
 Information about the sanctioning approach, publication of decisions, and penalties for all countries, 
except for Switzerland, is taken from ESMA (2012; Tables D.1., F.6.2., G.1., and Annex A.7). The 
sanctioning approach and penalties for Switzerland are from Kern (2013). 
11
 Maximum penalties related to disclosure of insider trades under TD are from Christensen et al. (2011). 
12
 The average number of staff employed in the national banking and insurance regulating institutions 
(2008-10) for all countries, except Switzerland, is from Horakova and Jordan (2013), as cited in 
Cumming et al. (2016). The average number of staff employed in the national banking and insurance 
regulating institutions (2009) for Switzerland is from FINMA (2009). 
The ITE index for our sample countries is presented in Table 2 (column 10). The 
sample country with the highest ITE index is Italy (6) followed by France (5), Belgium 
(4), the Netherlands (2), Austria and Germany (1), and Switzerland (0). Overall, French 
legal origin countries score better compared to German origin countries. The difference 
between average (mean) rankings is statistically significant at the 5% level.  
 
Our ITE index is based on very specific measures related to the public enforcement of 
the MAD. It is plausible that, for example, some countries fare highly by other indices 
but poorly by the ITE index. We therefore present rankings of our sample countries by 
relevant indices used in previous literature. For example, we present rankings of our 
sample countries by the regulator resource based measures of public enforcement 
(Jackson and Roe, 2009), the anti-self-dealing index (ASD) (Djankov et al., 2008), two 
public enforcement (PE) indices (La Porta et al., 2006; Djankov et al., 2008), the insider 
trading rules index (Cumming et al., 2011), the legal enforcement index (La Porta et al., 
1998), and the disclosure index (La Porta et al., 1998). 
 
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
 
The results for regulatory based measures (RStaff and RBudget) of public enforcement 
are reported in columns 2 and 3, respectively.
13
 Overall, French legal origin countries 
score higher compared to their German legal origin counterparts which is in line with 
the reported ITE rankings. The difference of resource based measures between French 
and German legal origin countries is, however, not statistically significant. Notably, we 
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 RStaff is a number of regulatory staff per million population. RBudget is regulatory budget per billion 
of GDP ($). Both are defined for an extended sample and observations in Jackson and Roe (2009). 
report for our sample a statistically significant difference between German and French 
legal origin countries regarding the enforcement of insider trading rules (Table 1). Our 
measure is, however, based on different sources and with different adjustments. For 
example, our adjustment is based on the size of stock markets rather than GDP as used 
in prior literature (e.g. Jackson and Roe, 2009). The size of stock markets could be 
better suited given that we examine the importance of public enforcement for insider 
dealing rather than its importance for the development of financial markets. It is also 
worth noting that staffing and budgets are both inputs rather than outputs of the 
enforcement activities (Jackson and Roe, 2009) and, thus, should be supplemented with 
some output measures. 
 
The results for the ASD index are reported in column (4) of Table 2. The differences in 
the mean ASD between our sample of German and French law countries are not 
statistically significant and they are, thus, consistent with the results reported in 
Djankov et al. (2008).
14
 The ranking of our sample countries by the public enforcement 
index of Djankov et al. (2008) is reported in column 5 (PE-DLLS). Overall, the 
difference between German and French legal origin countries is statistically significant. 
Contrary to the ranking by ITE, German legal origin countries outperform countries 
with French legal origin. Switzerland, for example, features highly (2
nd
 place) according 
to PE-DLLS but performs worst in terms of ITE among our sample countries. The poor 
ranking of Switzerland by ITE index should not come as a surprise given the extremely 
poor track record of Switzerland in the area of insider dealing (see e.g., FATF, 2005). 
The poor track record of Switzerland is at odds with an extremely developed banking 
                                                 
14
 Djankov et al. (2008) report a lack of statistically significant difference between the mean ASD index 
of German and French legal origin countries in their international sample of 72 countries.  
sector and stock market. During the 1990s, Swiss authorities brought only a few 
prosecutions to court and obtained only 14 convictions (Kern, 2013).
15
 The ranking by 
the public enforcement index of La Porta et al. (2006) (PE-LLS in column 6) is very 
much in line with the ranking according to our ITE index.
16
 
   
Column (7) reports the Insider Trading Index of Cumming et al. (2011). The 
corresponding values of this index are from November 2007 to October 2008 (and 
January 2006 to October 2007). Cumming et al. (2011) report a significantly higher 
Insider Trading Index for their sub-sample of nine German legal origin countries 
(worldwide) compared to the sub-sample of fifteen French legal origin countries 
(worldwide). The difference between the mean values is statistically significant at the 
1% level. The study however does not cover Belgium and the Netherlands, which are 
included in our sample of countries of French legal origin. This prevents us from 
making a direct comparison to their results by legal origin.
17
 
 
Columns (8) and (9) report the La Porta et al. (1998) measures of legal enforcement 
(LE) and disclosure index. The legal enforcement index for German origin countries in 
our sample is higher compared to the French legal origin countries. It is however 
opposite for the disclosure index. We find no statistically significant difference in the 
mean values of the legal and disclosure indices between French and German legal origin 
countries. 
                                                 
15
 Furthermore, in 2009 the SIX Swiss Exchange, headquartered in London and governed by UK law, 
moved its trading venue to Zurich and the exchange entity reincorporated as a Swiss legal entity, thereby 
avoiding the stricter requirements of UK law (Kern, 2013).  
16
 With an exception of Belgium which comes last according to La Porta et al. (2006). 
17
 Based on the limited data, the difference between French and German legal origin countries is not 
statistically significant. 
Overall, the results in Table 2 suggest that French legal origin countries score better by 
six out of nine indices. The differences between French and German legal origin 
countries are statistically significant only for PE-DLLS and ITE. We also present 
correlations between our ITE index with alternative measures in Table 3. ITE is highly 
negatively correlated with PE-DLLS and highly positively with PE-LLS and ASD. Our 
ITE public enforcement index is therefore more in line PE-LLS than with PE-DLLS. 
The results are also in line with Jackson and Roe (2009) who reported a negative 
correlation between PE-DLLS and PE-LLS in their international sample of developed 
and developing countries. The negative association of some of the cross-country public 
enforcement indices based on regulators’ formal powers (e.g. PE-LLS) and/or regulators 
formal qualities (e.g. PE-LLS) is often due to an ambiguous (i.e. open to interpretation) 
and weighing of index constituents.
18
 
 
*** Insert Table 3 about here *** 
 
 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
4.1 Sample selection process 
Data for insider transactions is collected from the Directors Deals (DD) database.
19
 The 
Directors Deals database applies the same classification of insiders across countries by 
including the following: full time executive directors and board members; former 
executives and former board members, members of supervisory boards; person 
                                                 
18
 Jackson and Roe (2009) provide an example of independent regulators that are integrated in a 
consolidated financial supervisor. Although theoretical literature is divided on the relative merits of 
independent and integrated regulators, PE-LLS index clearly favours independent regulators. 
19
 More information on this database is available at: http://www.directorsdeals.com. 
dispensing managerial responsibilities; non-executive directors (members of boards 
and/or in advisory capacity on part time basis). We start with all 93,804 director deals 
available for companies from our sample countries during the period 1
st
 January 2006 to 
31
st
 December 2013. For Austria and Switzerland, DD reports director dealings 
transactions only from January 2008 and March 2007 onwards respectively. For these 
two countries we update the sample using data available at the national regulator 
director dealings websites (i.e. for Austria from January 2006 to December 2007 and for 
Switzerland from January 2006 to February 2007). This yields a total initial sample of 
95,402 director dealing transactions, i.e. all transactions from January 2006 until 
December 2013 (see Table 4). 
 
*** Insert Table 4 about here*** 
 
From this total sample we exclude deals on securities other than ordinary (common) and 
preferred shares. We also exclude transfers, exercise and dividend related transactions, 
and keep only pure purchase and pure sale transactions. Furthermore, to ensure the 
integrity of the dataset we remove announcements that contain obvious errors, like 
having the day of the disclosure before the day of trading, as well as transactions where 
the announcement took place more than one month after the transaction. We also 
aggregate all purchase and sale deals in the same security disclosed on the same day. 
Such trading patterns might be due to the partial execution of orders and do not convey 
additional information. If the purchase and sale transactions occur on the same day and 
the aggregated net value is zero (i.e., an equal number of shares were bought and sold 
on the same trading day), we exclude these transactions. Net zero transactions occur 
seldom and this is typically the case when one director is selling shares to other 
directors.  
 
The above procedure results in 46,172 pure net deals in ordinary, preferred, and 
common shares, 29,514 (net) purchases and 16,658 (net) sales. The overall number of 
purchases is higher than the number of sales. This is also the case in all sample 
countries except in Switzerland with slightly more sales than purchases. The number of 
companies underlying the final number of director trading transactions is 2,096 for the 
total sample of 46,172 transactions. Thus, on average about 22 transactions are reported 
per company during our 8-year sample period. The highest percentage of purchases 
relative to sales during the sample period is recorded in Austria at 78%. Interestingly, 
the lowest percentage is revealed in Switzerland at 49% of purchase transactions.  
 
Figure 1 shows the development of disclosed insider trades for our total sample of seven 
countries. From Figure 1 we can clearly see that the number of purchases peaks during 
the recent financial crisis (i.e. in 2008). Before the crisis (2006-2007), the number of 
sales is in fact (often) higher than the number of purchases. From this we identify three 
distinct sub-periods: before the financial crisis (2006-07), during the financial crisis 
(2008-10), and after the financial crisis (2011-13). 
 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
There are 12,623 deals in the first (pre-crisis) sub-period, 18,629 deals during the crisis 
period, and 14,920 deals during the post-crisis period (see Table 4). The average 
number of declared purchase transactions per company is 14 and for sale transactions 8 
(reported for the total period). The percentage of purchases increased sharply in all 
sample countries during the crisis period. Notably, the two countries with the highest 
percentage of purchases during the crisis are Austria (83%) and Germany (82%). For 
the total sample, the percentage of purchases jumped in the crisis period to 74% (from 
52% before the crisis). After the crisis, the percentage of purchases dropped to 62%, 
which is still higher compared to the pre-crisis period. A further comparison of the 
sample countries shows that during the pre-crisis period there are more sales than 
purchases in France, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Netherlands. During the crisis 
period there are more purchases than sales in all sample countries. The same trend 
continues during the post-crisis period in all countries. 
 
The mean volume per purchase transaction is €843,963 (median is €39,053) and the 
mean volume per sale transaction is €2,404,320 (median is €128,071) (see Table 5). In 
line with the evidence reported in the literature (Fidrmuc et al. 2013; Fidrmuc et al., 
2006), purchase transactions are on average smaller than sale transactions. The overall 
volume of all sample transactions is about €65 billion. 
 
*** Insert Table 5 about here *** 
 
 
5. Methodology 
The empirical approach of our paper is different from Jaffe (1974), Rozeff and Zaman 
(1988), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) in that we examine a rapid price reaction around the 
announcement day of insider transactions instead of CARs over a 6-12 month period 
following disclosure. The rapid price reaction implicitly assumes some degree of market 
efficiency and has been used in related studies (see Friedrich et al., 2002; Fidrmuc et al., 
2013). We therefore use an event-study approach to analyse the short-run effects of 
legal insider trading disclosures. Our research design follows the common approach 
delineated in MacKinlay (1997) and in Campbell et al. (1997). 
 
The event we focus on is the disclosure of legal corporate insider transactions. We 
analyse the evolution of the stock price before the insider trading disclosure by looking 
at a period of twenty trading days prior to disclosure date. This analysis may provide 
valuable insights into the timing capabilities of corporate insiders. To investigate market 
reactions to the disclosure of legal insider trades we analyse the two, five, ten and 
twenty trading days following the disclosure date. 
 
The Market model residuals are used as abnormal returns. The model parameters are 
estimated using an estimation window of 100 trading days before the event window. To 
calculate market adjusted returns the following indices are used to proxy for country-
specific market returns: (1) Austria: ATX, (2) Belgium: BEL20, (3) France: CAC All 
Traded index, (4) Germany: CDAX, (5) Italy: FTSE-MIB index, (6) the Netherlands: 
AEX All share index, and (7) Switzerland: SMI. 
 
Overall, our procedure for measuring the price impact is a standard approach and thus 
makes our results better comparable to other insider trading event studies. We perform 
four types of statistical tests to examine the significance of cumulative abnormal 
returns: (i) Cross-section t-test (see Brown and Warner, 1980), (ii) Standardised Cross-
section t-test (see Boehmer et al., 1991), (iii) Corrado Rank test (see Corrado, 1989), 
and (iv) Generalised Sign test (see Cowan, 1992).  
 
 
6. Results and discussion 
6.1 Abnormal returns around the disclosure date 
Figure 2 presents the development of mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during 
the event window of 41 trading days (i.e. from trading day -20 to trading day +20 
around the event (disclosure) day (i.e. day zero)). Our results suggest that insiders tend 
to purchase stock of their companies after periods of negative abnormal returns, and 
they tend to sell stocks after periods of positive abnormal returns. 
 
*** Insert Figure 2 about here *** 
 
This pattern is consistent across our three sub-periods, i.e., before, during, and after the 
financial crisis (see Figure 3).  
 
*** Insert Figure 3 about here *** 
 
For the twenty trading days before the disclosure of insider purchases, we observe a 
significant average CAR of -1.77% (see Table 6). The cumulative abnormal return is 
negative for a significant portion of around 58% of all purchase transactions. After the 
disclosure of insider purchase transactions we document a positive and highly 
statistically significant mean CAR (0 to 20) of +1.55 % for the period from the 
disclosure day to day + 20. This positive abnormal performance is even more 
pronounced during the crisis period with a CAR (0 to 20) of 2.31%. Our results are 
therefore in line with our hypotheses: (i) Insider purchases create a significant (positive) 
price impact; (ii) when purchasing stocks of their own company, insiders act as 
contrarian investors; and (iii) the price impact seems to be particularly strong during the 
financial crisis. 
 
*** Insert Table 6 about here *** 
 
Corporate insiders in Europe execute sale transactions after periods of high abnormal 
returns. We observe an average CAR of +1.53% (significant at the 1% level) for the 
twenty trading days before the disclosure date (see Table 7). This pattern is most 
pronounced in the crisis period with a CAR (-20 to -1) of +1.96%. 
 
*** Insert Table 7 about here *** 
 
We document statistically significant negative CARs after the disclosure date (e.g. -
1.98% for the period from the disclosure day to day +20). The differences across sub-
periods are less pronounced compared to the evidence reported for purchases, with 
CARs (0 to 20) varying between about -1.8 and -2.1%. The mean CARs are negative 
and statistically significant in all sub-periods. Absolute CAR (0 to 20) values for sales 
are higher than for purchases in both pre and post-crisis periods. The absolute value for 
CARs following purchases is higher than corresponding CARs for sales only during the 
crisis period. The stronger effect of sales measured by absolute values of CAR is 
surprising and contradicts findings from previous (US and UK) literature that the effect 
of sales tends to be softened since they are often lead by liquidity and diversification 
reasons (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Firdmuc et al., 2006). 
 
6.2 Multivariate analysis 
To further investigate possible determinants of abnormal performance after insider 
trading disclosures, we perform a multivariate cross-sectional analysis with CAR0,20 
(cumulative abnormal return from the date of disclosure until trading day 20 after the 
disclosure date) as the dependent variable. The regression model is: 
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Sub2 is a dummy variable coded one for observations during the financial crisis period 
(2008-10), and zero otherwise. Further independent variables are the number of insider 
trades on the same day (Insider), the transaction volume expressed as a percentage of 
the market capitalization on the day of disclosure (Volume), the logarithm of the market 
capitalization on the day of disclosure (Size), the book-to-market ratio to control for 
valuation effects (BM), and our insider trading enforcement index (ITE).
20
 A higher 
financial risk may also contribute to a higher degree of information asymmetry. We 
therefore control for financial risk (Risk), proxied by Debt (D) to Total Asset (TA) ratio 
(D/TA). We also control for previous purchases (PP) and previous sales (PS) during the 
20 trading day period before the disclosure. Size and BM variables are frequently used 
in the literature to control for contrarian strategies (see Piotorski and Roulstone, 2005). 
We estimate this model (equation 1) separately for purchases and sales. The above 
estimations are repeated for different sub-periods after excluding Sub2, the dummy 
variable for the crisis period. 
 
Table 8 presents the results for insider purchase transactions for the total period (2006-
2013) and the three sub-periods. In the regression for the total sample (see Panel A) the 
coefficient for Sub2 is positive and highly statistically significant. Consistent with our 
conjecture and our univariate results, the crisis period is associated with a significantly 
larger positive abnormal performance in the first 21 trading days after the disclosure of 
insider purchase transactions. 
 
The coefficients for PS and Size are, as expected, negative and highly statistically 
significant in the regressions for all periods and all sub-periods (see Panels A, B, C, and 
D). The coefficients for BM are, as expected, positive but only statistically significant in 
the crisis period (see Panel C). The coefficient for Risk is positive and statistically 
significant only in the pre-crisis period. During the crisis period, larger purchases are 
positively, and significantly, associated with returns (see variable Volume in Panel C). 
                                                 
20
 Data on stock prices and company characteristics (Total assets, total liabilities, total shareholder equity, 
and market capitalization) were provided by Thomson Reuters Eikon and Datastream. 
Importantly, the coefficients for ITE are negative and highly statistically significant in 
regressions for the total sample and in all three sub-periods (see Table 8, Panels A, B, 
C, and D). These results lend strong support for our hypothesis regarding the 
importance of the enforcement of insider trading regulation on the price impact of 
disclosure. Countries with a higher public enforcement exhibit a smaller price impact 
compared to countries with a weaker public enforcement. 
 
*** Insert Table 8 about here *** 
 
We estimate the economic significance of our results by examining how a 1-standard 
deviation change in an explanatory variable (e.g. ITE) (factor) affects CAR0,20 
(Coefficientfactor*factor). The overall effect of public enforcement on disclosure of 
purchases is negative with the strongest economic impact of ITE during the first and 
third sub-period. The results suggest that public enforcement has the most pronounced 
economic effect before and after the financial crisis and less during the financial crisis. 
For example, a 1-standard-deviation increase in ITE leads to a 76.5 basis points (bp) (=-
0.3179*2.4072) reduction in cumulative abnormal returns associated with purchases 
during the first sub-period and a reduction of 82.9 bp (=-0.3567*2.3248) in the third 
sub-period. During the financial crisis the economic effect of ITE on CAR0,20 is much 
lower (reduction of 36.2 bp (= -0.1580*2.2912) in CAR0,20). 
 
The results of the multivariate analysis for insider sales are presented in Table 9. 
Overall and in the pre and post-crisis periods, the coefficients for ITE are negative but 
not statistically significant. Therefore the public enforcement tends to be less important 
for insider sales. This is in line with findings that insider sales generally have lower 
information content since they are often motivated by liquidity and diversification needs 
(see Fidrmuc et al., 2013). The ccoefficient for the ITE index is positive and statistically 
significant only during the crisis period (see Table 9, Panel C). Thus, a better public 
enforcement of the MAD leads to a lower price impact (i.e. less negative abnormal 
returns) only in crisis periods (i.e., when information asymmetry between insiders and 
outside investors tend to be larger). Regarding economic significance, a 1-standard 
deviation change in the ITE index leads to a 47.2 bp increase in CARs (i.e. a less 
negative 21 day CAR after sales announcement) during the second sub-period. 
 
*** Insert Table 9 about here *** 
 
Coefficients for other variables (PP, BM) have expected signs in line with our 
predictions. Volume is again not statistically significant, while the size of the firm (Size) 
plays, as expected, an important role in regressions for the total sample and during the 
post-crisis period.
21
 
 
 
7. Additional robustness checks
22
 
We conduct additional robustness checks for our ITE index by examining ranking 
changes if a particular component is added or dropped from the index. For example, we 
use Jackson and Roe’s (2009) resource based measures (RStaff and RBudget) instead of 
                                                 
21
 Volume and BM exhibit low tolerance levels (i.e. high correlation) in Panels A and D. We repeated 
estimates for the model without Volume. The signs and significance levels of all coefficients remain the 
same thus suggesting that the multicollinearity does not affect our results. Unreported estimates are 
available from authors upon request.   
22
 Unreported results in this section are available from authors upon request. 
our measure of supervisory capacity. Unreported results remain in line with the results 
highlighted in Table 2. Importantly, all French legal origin countries rank above their 
German counterparts. Similarly results with PE-LLS, instead of the sanctioning 
approach (ESMA, 2012), produce very similar results.  
 
We also re-calculated the ITE index by adding RBudget, PE-LLS, and ASD index, for 
example, and excluding some of the measures (e.g., supervisory capacity, sanctioning 
approach). Overall, the ITE index is robust to use of different regulatory proxies and 
indices. Inclusion (or exclusion) of these indices does not materially affect our 
conclusions regarding the differences among our sample countries and the importance 
of public enforcement. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
We examine the importance of public enforcement of the MAD on the price reaction 
following disclosure of insider trading. Our sample consists of seven civil law countries 
of French and German legal origin. The examination of the public enforcement of the 
market abuse regulation in EU is timely. It contributes to the debate about the recent 
replacement of the MAD with the EU Market Abuse Regulation (MAR) (592/2014) and 
the introduction of the Criminal Sanctions for the Market Abuse Directive (CSMAD) 
(2014/57/EU). 
 
Our main findings are that French legal origin countries (France, Italy, Belgium, and 
Netherlands) score significantly better in terms of the ITE public enforcement index 
compared to their German (Austria, German, and Switzerland) origin counterparts. The 
ranking by the ITE index still holds when using alternative regulatory and enforcements 
constituents. Second, insider purchase transactions take place after decline in abnormal 
returns and are followed by price increases. This positive price effect of disclosure of 
purchase transactions is more pronounced in countries with a weaker public 
enforcement of the MAD. Sale transactions also contain relevant price information, 
which is in contrast to findings in the US (see Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). Similar to 
purchases, insiders also adopt contrarian strategies when selling shares. For sale 
transactions, the ITE index is significantly related to cumulative abnormal returns only 
during the period of financial crisis.  
 
Evidence regarding the relative importance of private and public enforcement of 
securities laws for financial market development is inconclusive. While La Porta et al. 
(2006) and Djankov et al. (2008) point towards private enforcement, Jackson and Roe 
(2009) conclude otherwise. Our results highlight the importance of the public 
enforcement of regulation on insider trading. The policy implication of our results is in 
line with Jackson and Roe (2009) who argue that the recent shift by the World Bank 
towards private, rather than public, enforcement of securities laws might be premature 
and not entirely evidence based. 
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Table 1: Public enforcement of insider trading rules 
This table presents regulatory authorities responsible for insider trading, entry-into-force dates for the MAD and TD, various aspects of sanctioning insider dealings, and supervisory 
capacity in sample countries.  Classification by legal origin is from La Porta et al. (1998). Either (sanctioning approach) means either administrative actions or criminal sanctions 
approach. Both (sanctioning approach) means both administrative and criminal sanctions approach. Sanctioning approach, publication of decisions and penalties for insider dealing 
(under MAD) for all countries, except for Switzerland, are from ESMA (2012; Tables D.1., F.6.2., G.1., and Annex A.7). The sanctioning approach and penalties for Switzerland are 
from Kern (2013). The number of natural and legal persons sanctioned or discharged for insider dealing during 2008-10, is from ESMA (2012; Tables F.3.2 A and B). MAD (TD) entry-
intro-force dates and penalties related to insider trading (MAD and TD) are from Christensen et al. (2011). Supervisory capacity is calculated by the authors as the average number of 
staff divided by the average stock market trading volume (2008-10). The average stock market trading volume (in billion US$) for all countries, except Switzerland, is from Cumming et 
al. (2016). The average number of staff employed in the national banking and insurance regulating institutions (2008-10) for all countries, except Switzerland, is from Horakova and 
Jordan (2013), as cited in Cumming et al. (2016). The average stock market trading volume (2007-09; in billion US$) for Switzerland is from SIX Swiss Exchange (Annual Statistics, 
available from: www.six-swiss-exchange.com). The average number of staff employed in the national banking and insurance regulating institutions (2009) for Switzerland is from 
FINMA (2009). Sample country scores with respect to sanctions and supervisory capacity are reported in [parentheses] in columns 6, 7, 8 and 9. P-values for T-test for differences in 
means and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for difference in medians. In column 6, maximum values used for calculation of means and medians. 
Country Responsible authority MAD (TD) 
Entry-Into-
Force Dates 
Sanctions for insider dealing (MAD) Sanction related to TD Number of sanctions 
or discharges 
(MAD) 
Supervisory 
capacity 
Sanctioning 
approach 
Publication of 
decisions 
Minimum/Maximum 
penalties (€) 
Max penalties (€000) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
German legal origin 
Austria Financial market authority 
(FMA) 
Jan-05 (Apr- 07) Either No No penalties [5] 30 [6] 0 [6] 0.06173 [1] 
Germany Federal financial services 
supervisory authority (BaFin) 
Oct-04 (Jan-07) Either No (1-999)/ (100,000-999,999) 
[4] 
or more 
200 [4] 2 [5] 0.01689 [3] 
Switzerland Swiss Financial Market 
Authority (FINMA); since 
2009 
Jan-08 (Jun-07) Either No No penalties [5] 0 [7] n.a. 0.00002 [7] 
French legal origin 
Belgium Commission for banking and 
insurance (CFBA) 
Sep-05 (Sep-08) Both Yes (1,000-9,999)/ pending on 
profit obtained [3] 
2,500 [2] 22 [3] 0.01661 [4] 
France Autorité des Marchés Financier 
(AMF) 
Jul-05 (Dec-07) Both Yes No min./5 mil. or more [1] 10,000 [1] 158 [1] 0.00873 [6] 
Italy Commissione Nazionale per la 
Società e la Borsa (Consob) 
May-05 (Apr-
09) 
Both Yes 100,000/5 mil. or more [1] 620 [3] 38 [2] 0.04444 [2] 
Netherlands Authority for the financial 
markets (AFM) 
Oct-05 (Jan-09) Either Yes No min./1 mil. – 4,999,999 
[2] 
120 [5] 3 [4] 0.01218 [5] 
Mean (median) for German legal origin  4.67 (5) 76.70 (30) 1 (1) 0.02621(0.01689) 
Mean (median) for French legal origin 1.75 (1.5) 3,310 (1,560) 
 
55.25 (30) 
 
0.02049( 0.01440) 
German versus French;  P-values for differences in means and medians 0.000 (0.102) 0.067 (0.109) 
 
0.042 (0.180) 0.067 (0.593) 
Table 2:  Insider trading public enforcement Index (ITE) 
This table presents values for the ITE index and comparison with other indices by legal origin. The ranking for sample countries by different indices is reported in 
[parentheses]. RStaff is a number of regulatory staff per million population (extended sample and observations) as defined in Jackson and Roe (2009) (Column 2). 
RBudget is regulatory budget per billion of GDP ($) (extended sample and observations) as defined in Jackson and Roe (2009) (Column 3). The Anti-self-dealing 
(ASD) index (available at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html) measures private enforcement, as defined in Djankov et al. (2008) (Column 4). 
PE-DLLS (available at  http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/data.html) is a public enforcement index based on whether or not certain suspect corporate 
transactions can lead to a fine or jail sentences for the approving body, or fine or jail sentence for the principal wrongdoer as defined in Djankov et al. (2008) (Column 
5). PE-LLS is a public enforcement index, calculated as arithmetic average of: (i) supervisor characteristics index; (ii) its rule-making power index; (iii) its 
investigative powers index; (iv) orders authority index; and (v) criminal authority index, as defined in La Porta et al. (2006) (Column 6). Column (7) reports the Insider 
Trading Index of Cumming et al. (2011). The corresponding values of this index are for the period over November 2007 to October 2008. Columns (8) and (9) report 
La Porta et al. (1998) measures of legal enforcement (LE) and Disclosure index. LE is an average of 3 legal variables. Disclosure index measures the inclusion or 
omission of 90 items in annual reports. Our Insider Trading Enforcement (ITE) index is calculated based on data from Table 1 (as described in Section 3) (Column 10). 
Reported probabilities are for a two samples T and Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test for difference in means and medians, respectively. 
Studies Jackson and Roe (2009) Djankov et al. (2008) LLS 
(2006) 
 Cumming et al. 
(2011) 
LLS (1998) This study 
Index RStaff RBudget ASD PE-DLLS PE-LLS Insider trading rules LE  Disclosure ITE 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
German legal origin 
Austria 9.97 [3] 34,464 [3] 0.21 [6] 1.00 [1] 0.17 [6] 2 [2] 9.4 [2] 54 [6] 1 [5] 
Germany  4.43 [7] 12,903 [7] 0.28 [4] 1.00 [1] 0.22 [5] 3 [1] 9.1 [3] 62 [4] 1 [5] 
Switzerland 8.87 [4] 29,340 [4] 0.27 [5] 0.75 [2] 0.33 [4] 3 [1] 10 [1] 68 [2] 0 [6] 
French legal origin 
Belgium 13.76 [2] 27,276 [6] 0.54 [1] 0.50 [3] 0.15 [7] n.a. 9.4 [2] 61 [5] 4 [3] 
France 5.91 [6] 28,851 [5] 0.38 [3] 0.50 [3] 0.77 [1] 2 [2] 8.7 [4] 69 [1] 5 [2] 
Italy 7.25 [5] 61,239 [2] 0.42 [2] 0.00 [4] 0.48 [2] 3 [1] 7.1 [5] 62 [4] 6 [1] 
Netherlands 23.53 [1] 131,285 [1] 0.20 [7] 0.00 [4] 0.47 [3] n.a. 10 [1] 64 [3] 2 [4] 
German versus French legal origin 
German origin; Mean (median) 7.76 (8.87) 25,569 
(29,340) 
 
0.25 (0.27) 0.92 (1.00) 
 
0.24 (0.22) 
 
2.67 (3.00) 9.50 (9.40) 61.33 (62) 0.67 (1) 
French origin; Mean (median) 8.97 (7.25) 39,122 
(28,851) 
 
0.39 (0.42) 0.33 (0.50) 
 
0.47 (0.48) 
 
2.50 (2.50) 8.80 (8.70) 64.00 (62) 4.25 (5) 
P-values for differences in 
means  (medians) 
0.373 
(0.593) 
 
0.267    
(0.285) 
 
0.183 
(0.109) 
0.015 
(0.103) 
 
0.202    
(0.285) 
 
0.789 
(0.317) 
0.407 
(0.166) 
0.534 
(0.276) 
0.019 
(0.109) 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix 
This table presents the correlations among our insider trading public enforcement index (ITE), public enforcement indices (PE-DLLS, PE-LLS), legal index (LE), 
regulatory resource measures of public enforcement (RStaff, RBudget, Supervisory capacity), anti-self-dealing (private enforcement) index (ASD), insider trading rules 
index, and Disclosure index. List-wise deletions were used to handle missing values for Insider trading rules index. All variables are defined in Tables 1 and 2. ** and 
* indicate 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
 
 
RStaff RBudget ASD PE-DLLS PE-LLS 
Insider T. 
rules 
LE Disclosure ITE 
RStaff 1 
        
RBudget 0.3857 1 
       
ASD -0.4538 0.5664 1 
 
      
PE-DLLS 0.0882 -0.8379* -0.9154** 1 
     
PE-LLS -0.3381 0.2518 0.7953 -0.6384 1 
    
Insider T. rules -0.2686 0.0885 0.1808 -0.2182 -0.2873 1 
   
LE 0.2938 -0.7461 -0.8308 0.8508* -0.4238 -0.1588 1 
  
Disclosure -0.4049 -0.1531 0.5048 -0.3237 0.697 0.2282 0.0534 1 
 
ITE -0.3025 0.6607 0.9205** -0.8737* 0.7655 -0.1351 -0.8963** 0.2159 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Data sources and sample selection process 
This table presents the sample selection process in the sample countries with the number of purchases and sales transactions for the total sample period and three sub-
periods, as well as the number of companies for the total sample period. We use the first 2 digits of a company’s International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) 
as abbreviations for each country (AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, CH=Switzerland, DE=Germany, FR=France, IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands). The percentage of 
purchases vs. the percentage of sales is reported in brackets. *Data is from Directors Deals database, except for Austria (01/2006-12/2007) and Switzerland (2006-
02/2007). For these periods data has been collected for these countries from national regulators’ directors’ dealings web-sides. 
 
 AT BE CH DE FR IT NL Total 
Transaction in Directors Deals database* 2,822 5,207 15,631 15,658 24,962 20,826 10,296 95,402 
Securities other than ordinary (common) and preferred shares -27 -262 -1,631 -333 -1,215 -1,057 -1,130 -5,655 
Deals other than pure purchases or sales  -216 -1,961 -2,520 -2,150 -6,506 -4,226 -5,676 -23,255 
Announcement dates before the deal date -4 -17 -567 -52 -9 -54 -80 -783 
Announcement dates later than one month -52 -136 -17 -299 -1,682 -607 -230 -3,023 
Aggregated deals from the same date -375 -351 -1,850 -2,844 -2,901 -2802 -842 -11,965 
Zero net transactions -14 -13 -22 -79 -66 -66 -8 -268 
Missing data on companies’ characteristics -43 -1 -930 -894 -223 -1,247 -943 -4,281 
Total sample (2006-2013) 2,091 2,466 8,094 9,007 12,360 10,767 1,387 46,172 
     Purchases 1,637 1,480 3,933 6,583 7,524 7,547 810 29,514 
     Sales 454 986 4,161 2,424 4,836 3,220 577 16,658 
Purchases vs. sales (78;22) (60;40) (49;51) (73;27) (61;39) (70;30) (58;42) (64;36) 
Sub-period 1 (2006-2007) 739 485 2,053 2,770 2,608 3,569 399 12,623 
     Purchases 537 213 710 1,713 1,117 2,122 163 6,575 
     Sales 202 272 1,343 1,057 1,491 1,447 236 6,048 
Purchases vs. sales (73;27) (44;56) (35;65) (62;38) (43;57) (59;41) (41;59) (52;48) 
Sub-period 2 (2008-2010) 857 1,020 2,615 3,778 5,329 4,476 554 18,629 
     Purchases 715 724 1,395 3,116 3,765 3,612 375 13,702 
     Sales 142 296 1,220 662 1,564 864 179 4,927 
Purchases vs. sales (83;17) (71;29) (53;47) (82;18) (71;29) (81;19) (68;32) (74;26) 
Sub-period 3 (2011-2013) 495 961 3,426 2,459 4,423 2,722 434 14,920 
     Purchases 385 543 1,828 1,754 2,642 1,813 272 9,237 
     Sales 110 418 1,598 705 1,781 909 162 5,683 
Purchases vs. sales (78;22) (57;43) (53;47) (71;29) (60;40) (67;33) (63;37) (62;38) 
Number of companies (total sample) 89 127 250 584 613 312 121 2,096 
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Table 5: Sample descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for the total sample of 46,172 corporate insider transactions in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland during the entire sample 
period (January 2006 to December 2013). For the number of companies, the total for all transactions does 
not correspond to the sum of sales and purchases since not all companies have only sales or only 
purchases (rather most (not all) experience sales and purchases). 
 
 
 Number of 
companies 
Number of 
disclosures 
Volume per 
disclosure (in €) 
Total volume of 
disclosed transactions 
(in million €) 
   
Mean Median 
 
      
Purchase transactions 1,868 29,514 843,963 39,053 24,908.7 
      
Sale transactions 1,663 16,658 2,404,320 128,071 40,051.2 
      
All transactions 2,096 46,172 1,406,911 59,339 64,959.9 
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Table 6: CARs around disclosure of purchases 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and numbers of positive and negative CARs (N) for the total sample and three sub-periods. Reported CARs are for periods 
of 20 trading days before disclosures (-20 to -1), as well as 2, 5, 10, and 20 days after disclosure. Four different significance tests are used (reported is the 
corresponding test statistic and the p-value): (i) Cross-section t-test (see, e.g. Brown and Warner (1980); (ii) Standardised Cross-section t-test (see Boehmer et al., 
1991); (iii) Corrado Rank test (see Corrado, 1989); (iv) Generalised Sign test (Cowan, 1992). 
 
Panel A: 2006-13                   
Event Window CAR N (pos:neg) Cross-sec. t-test(i) p-value St. cross - sec. t-test(ii) p-value Corrado rank test(iii) p-value Gen. sign test(iv) p-value 
(-20...-1) -1.77% 12408 : 16845 -20.7568 0.0000 -25.7607 0.0000 -8.9058 0.0000 -42.6170 0.0000 
(0...2) 0.49% 15523 : 13730 14.4029 0.0000 11.7940 0.0000 4.6170 0.0000 -6.0215 0.0000 
(0...5) 0.79% 15649 : 13604 17.3438 0.0000 13.9654 0.0000 5.3982 0.0000 -4.5412 0.0000 
(0...10) 1.05% 15601 : 13652 17.7280 0.0000 15.4312 0.0000 5.2922 0.0000 -5.1052 0.0000 
(0...20) 1.55% 15671 : 13582 18.9281 0.0000 16.3908 0.0000 5.6015 0.0000 -4.2828 0.0000 
Panel B: 2006-07                   
(-20...-1) -2.89% 2446 : 4018 -18.8264 0.0000 -19.6556 0.0000 -8.7592 0.0000 -25.3583 0.0000 
(0...2) 0.33% 3284 : 3180 6.0021 0.0000 6.1920 0.0000 2.8229 0.0048 -4.4590 0.0000 
(0...5) 0.42% 3323 : 3141 5.9054 0.0000 6.3299 0.0000 2.8019 0.0051 -3.4863 0.0005 
(0...10) 0.50% 3326 : 3138 5.1382 0.0000 6.3737 0.0000 2.7083 0.0068 -3.4115 0.0006 
(0...20) 0.00% 3168 : 3296 0.0239 0.9809 1.3186 0.1873 0.7412 0.4586 -7.3519 0.0000 
Panel C: 2008-10                   
(-20...-1) -1.46% 6000 : 7615 -10.8308 0.0000 -16.5304 0.0000 -7.1226 0.0000 -21.6013 0.0000 
(0...2) 0.54% 7337 : 6278 10.6200 0.0000 6.5331 0.0000 4.2470 0.0000 1.3656 0.1720 
(0...5) 0.92% 7373 : 6242 12.6965 0.0000 7.6785 0.0000 5.0665 0.0000 1.9841 0.0472 
(0...10) 1.34% 7461 : 6154 14.3580 0.0000 9.5715 0.0000 5.8939 0.0000 3.4957 0.0005 
(0...20) 2.31% 7608 : 6007 17.9580 0.0000 13.9634 0.0000 7.6527 0.0000 6.0209 0.0000 
Panel D: 2011-13                   
(-20...-1) -1.33% 4019 : 5155 -9.9990 0.0000 -11.6070 0.0000 -6.6404 0.0000 -17.3135 0.0000 
(0...2) 0.52% 4984 : 4190 8.4613 0.0000 8.6570 0.0000 5.2480 0.0000 2.8691 0.0041 
(0...5) 0.76% 4967 : 4207 10.1874 0.0000 10.6911 0.0000 5.6957 0.0000 2.5135 0.0120 
(0...10) 0.84% 4879 : 4295 8.9480 0.0000 9.6534 0.0000 4.3778 0.0000 0.6730 0.5009 
(0...20) 1.12% 4833 : 4341 8.8641 0.0000 7.9449 0.0000 4.1978 0.0000 -0.2890 0.7726 
40 
 
Table 7: CARs around disclosure of sales 
Mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the numbers of positive and negative (N) CARs for the total sample and three sub-periods. Reported CARs are for 
periods of 20 trading days before disclosures (-20 to -1), as well as 2, 5, 10, and 20 days after disclosure. Four different significance tests are used (reported is the 
corresponding test statistic and the p-value): (i) Cross-section t-test (see, e.g. Brown and Warner (1980); (ii) Standardised Cross-section t-test (see Boehmer et al., 
1991); (iii) Corrado Rank test (see Corrado, 1989); (iv) Generalised Sign test (Cowan, 1992). 
 
Panel A: 2006-13 
         
Event Window CAR N (pos:neg) Cross-sec. t-test(i) p-value St. cross - sec. t-test(ii) p-value Corrado rank test(iii) p-value Gen. sign test(iv) p-value 
(-20...-1) 1.53% 8837 : 7675 12.6228 0.0000 18.3236 0.0000 6.8898 0.0000 2.3779 0.0174 
(0...2) -0.27% 7513 : 8999 -7.1387 0.0000 -4.5602 0.0000 -2.7375 0.0062 -18.2571 0.0000 
(0...5) -0.57% 7149 : 9363 -10.1065 0.0000 -7.8748 0.0000 -4.6457 0.0000 -23.9302 0.0000 
(0...10) -1.03% 6933 : 9579 -13.6565 0.0000 -11.5199 0.0000 -5.5659 0.0000 -27.2966 0.0000 
(0...20) -1.98% 6737 : 9775 -19.2019 0.0000 -18.3168 0.0000 -7.7804 0.0000 -30.3513 0.0000 
Panel B: 2006-07 
         
(-20...-1) 1.22% 3203 : 2756 6.8443 0.0000 11.5271 0.0000 5.7196 0.0000 2.3991 0.0164 
(0...2) -0.14% 2716 : 3243 -2.5168 0.0118 -1.2085 0.2269 -1.6596 0.0970 -10.2306 0.0000 
(0...5) -0.47% 2587 : 3372 -6.2813 0.0000 -4.7993 0.0000 -3.4345 0.0006 -13.5760 0.0000 
(0...10) -0.93% 2486 : 3473 -8.7706 0.0000 -6.7340 0.0000 -4.5945 0.0000 -16.1953 0.0000 
(0...20) -1.84% 2418 : 3541 -12.4457 0.0000 -9.9691 0.0000 -6.5688 0.0000 -17.9588 0.0000 
Panel C: 2008-10 
         
(-20...-1) 1.96% 2664 : 2235 8.1079 0.0000 8.9141 0.0000 6.4106 0.0000 5.9781 0.0000 
(0...2) -0.28% 2223 : 2676 -3.6269 0.0003 -1.8042 0.0712 -2.2814 0.0225 -6.6233 0.0000 
(0...5) -0.51% 2154 : 2745 -4.4202 0.0000 -2.6117 0.0090 -3.5610 0.0004 -8.5949 0.0000 
(0...10) -0.88% 2117 : 2782 -5.7044 0.0000 -4.1274 0.0000 -3.4207 0.0006 -9.6522 0.0000 
(0...20) -1.76% 2066 : 2833 -8.2784 0.0000 -8.3975 0.0000 -5.5135 0.0000 -11.1094 0.0000 
Panel D: 2011-13 
         
(-20...-1) 1.30% 3043 : 2612 6.4617 0.0000 11.5794 0.0000 6.0679 0.0000 5.0611 0.0000 
(0...2) -0.31% 2560 : 3095 -5.2319 0.0000 -4.8726 0.0000 -2.5641 0.0103 -7.7852 0.0000 
(0...5) -0.63% 2473 : 3182 -6.4987 0.0000 -7.6405 0.0000 -4.2477 0.0000 -10.0991 0.0000 
(0...10) -1.11% 2425 : 3230 -8.6341 0.0000 -9.5135 0.0000 -5.0270 0.0000 -11.3758 0.0000 
(0...20) -2.08% 2364 : 3291 -11.9067 0.0000 -13.2150 0.0000 -7.0057 0.0000 -12.9982 0.0000 
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Table 8: Multivariate analysis of insider purchase transactions 
Results for the total sample (Panel A), and three sub-periods (Panels B, C, and D, respectively). The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for the first 21 trading days after the date of 
disclosure (including the date of disclosure) (CAR0,20). Prior purchase (PP) and Prior sale (PS) are 
dummy variables coded one if insiders bought (sold) stocks in their own company during the last 20 
trading days prior to the date of disclosure (=day 0). Firm size (Size) is the natural logarithm of 
company’s market capitalization on day 0. Sub2 is a dummy variable coded one for observations during 
the financial crisis period (2008-10), and zero otherwise. Insider is the number of insiders trading on the 
same day. Transaction volume is expressed as a percentage of the market capitalization on the day of 
disclosure (Volume). Debt-to-total asset ratio is a proxy for financial risk (Risk). BM is the book-to-market 
ratio. ITE is our insider trading enforcement index. Tolerance is a diagnostic test for multicollinearity (1 
divided by Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)). White (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted estimates. 
Panel A: Total  Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 Sub2 0.5745 3.08 0.002 0.9847 
 PP  -0.1469 -0.74 0.457 0.9077 
 PS -2.1675 -6.4 0.000 0.9083 
 Insider -0.0992 -0.92 0.359 0.9949 
 Volume -0.0004 -0.07 0.940 0.9982 
 Risk  0.8272 1.80 0.072 0.9401 
 Size -0.2995 -5.95 0.000 0.9567 
 BM 0.1401 1.19 0.234 0.9899 
 ITE -0.2505 -6.05 0.000 0.9463 
 Constant 5.0250 7.13 0.000  
 F-value   15.47 0.000   
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0083 (0.0078)  
 
Panel B: Sub1 Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 PP  -0.1022 -0.31 0.758 0.8762 
 PS -1.0722 -2.00 0.045 0.8646 
 Insider -0.1678 -1.65 0.100 0.9901 
 Volume 0.0041 1.54 0.124 0.9974 
 Risk  1.9132 2.28 0.023 0.8810 
 Size -0.2239 -2.78 0.005 0.8961 
 BM 0.6644 1.69 0.091 0.9795 
 ITE -0.3179 -4.86 0.000 0.9267 
 Constant 2.9652 2.54 0.011  
 F-value  6.2 0.000  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0126 (0.0106)  
 
Panel C: Sub2 Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 PP  0.2460 0.76 0.445 0.9160 
 PS -2.6942 -4.16 0.000 0.9250 
 Insider 0.0390 0.18 0.858 0.9925 
 Volume 0.5175 2.57 0.010 0.9756 
 Risk  1.3005 1.91 0.056 0.9337 
 Size -0.1797 -2.23 0.026 0.9434 
 BM 2.3783 9.74 0.000 0.9781 
 ITE -0.1580 -2.25 0.025 0.9396 
 Constant 0.7767 0.67 0.502  
 F-value  18.67 0.000  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0281 (0.0272)  
 
Panel D: Sub3 Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 PP  -0.6514 -1.95 0.051 0.9178 
 PS -2.0662 -4.01 0.000 0.9227 
 Insider -0.2167 -0.34 0.733 0.9925 
 Volume -0.4506 -4.57 0.000 0.9557 
 Risk  -0.6143 -0.76 0.448 0.9679 
 Size -0.3912 -4.42 0.000 0.9467 
 BM 0.0164 0.62 0.535 0.9582 
 ITE -0.3567 -5.37 0.000 0.9544 
 Constant 8.2356 6.00 0.000  
 F-value  11.25 0.000  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0156 (0.0141)  
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Table 9: Multivariate analysis of insider sale transactions 
Results for the total sample (Panel A), and three sub-periods (Panels B, C, and D, respectively). The 
dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return for the first 21 trading days after the date of 
disclosure (including the date of disclosure) (CAR0,20). Prior purchase (PP) and Prior sale (PS) are 
dummy variables coded one if insiders bought (sold) stocks in their own company during the last 20 
trading days prior to the date of disclosure (=day 0). Firm size (Size) is the natural logarithm of 
company’s market capitalization on day 0. Sub2 is a dummy variable coded one for observations during 
the financial crisis period (2008-10), and zero otherwise. Insider is the number of insiders trading on the 
same day. Transaction volume is expressed as a percentage of the market capitalization on the day of 
disclosure (Volume). Debt-to-total asset ratio is a proxy for financial risk (Risk). BM is the book-to-market 
ratio. ITE is our insider trading enforcement index. Tolerance is a diagnostic test for multicollinearity (1 
divided by Variance Inflation Factor (VIF)). White (1980) heteroskedasticity adjusted estimates. 
Panel A: Total  Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 Sub2 -0.9128 -3.35 0.001 0.9890 
 PP  1.7398 4.13 0.000 0.9015 
 PS -0.2469 -1.02 0.306 0.9059 
 Insider -0.2066 -1.71 0.086 0.9881 
 Volume -0.0122 -1.93 0.054 0.3163 
 Risk  -0.5782 -1.27 0.205 0.9685 
 Size 0.2155 2.91 0.004 0.9236 
 BM 0.0853 5.95 0.000 0.3153 
 ITE -0.0089 -0.18 0.855 0.9293 
 Constant -3.9748 -3.58 0.000  
 F-value  20.52 0.000  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0082 (0.0073)  
 
Panel B: Sub1 Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 PP  1.3848 2.44 0.015 0.8907 
 PS 0.3734 0.99 0.324 0.8951 
 Insider -0.4136 -3.07 0.002 0.9860 
 Volume -0.0578 -1.65 0.099 0.9674 
 Risk  0.0554 0.06 0.955 0.8803 
 Size 0.1664 1.39 0.166 0.9021 
 BM 1.0846 2.24 0.025 0.9414 
 ITE -0.0649 -0.79 0.427 0.9296 
 Constant -3.5718 -2.12 0.034  
 F-value  3.65 0.000  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0088 (0.0065)  
 
Panel C: Sub2 Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 PP  2.1549 2.30 0.021 0.8811 
 PS -0.6390 -1.26 0.210 0.8859 
 Insider -0.2385 -0.65 0.515 0.9550 
 Volume 0.2263 1.77 0.077 0.9441 
 Risk  -1.8700 -1.45 0.148 0.9291 
 Size 0.2794 1.87 0.061 0.8764 
 BM 0.6843 1.28 0.201 0.9586 
 ITE 0.2001 2.07 0.038 0.8880 
 Constant -6.0213 -2.71 0.007  
 F-value  3.24 0.001  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0088 (0.0062)  
 
Panel D: Sub3 Independent variables coefficient t-value p-value tolerance 
 PP  1.6288 2.8 0.005 0.9216 
 PS -0.3667 -0.96 0.339 0.9200 
 Insider 0.8439 2.87 0.004 0.9941 
 Volume -0.0122 -1.91 0.056 0.3039 
 Risk  -0.4905 -0.88 0.376 0.9839 
 Size 0.2876 2.32 0.020 0.8422 
 BM 0.0875 5.83 0.000 0.2986 
 ITE -0.1286 -1.68 0.092 0.9024 
 Constant -6.1545 -3.11 0.002  
 F-value  18.00 0.000  
 R2 (R2-adj.)  0.0187 (0.0163)  
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Figure 1: Insider transactions during sample period 
This figure provides the number of monthly insider purchase and sale transactions for our total sample 
comprising all deals disclosed in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland for each month during the entire sample period (January 2006 to December 2013). 
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Figure 2: CARs around the disclosure date 
This figure shows mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) for the total sample of 29,514 insider 
purchase and 16,658 insider sale transactions. CARs are computed in cumulating abnormal returns of the 
last 20 trading days prior to the disclosure date (T-20 to T-1), the abnormal return on the disclosure date 
(T0), and the abnormal returns in the first 20 trading days after the disclosure date (T1 to T20). 
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Figure 3: CARs in three sub-periods 
In Panel A we present CARs (CAAR: Cumulative average abnormal returns) around the disclosure date of purchase transactions for the total sample (2006-13), in the pre-
crisis period (2006-07), during the crisis (2008-10), and after the crisis (2011-13). Panel B exhibits CARs around the disclosure date of sale transactions for the total sample 
(2006-13), in the pre-crisis period (2006-07), during the crisis (2008-10), and after the crisis (2011-13). 
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